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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a rehearing on an appeal from the denial by the 
lower Court of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Default Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor presiding. 
DISPOSITION 
The Court below entered its order denying the Defen-
dant's Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment. 
This Court affirmed the Lower Court in a per curiam opinion 
dated July 26, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal as a matter of law of the 
denial of the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Default Judgment and a remand to the Lower Court for a trial 
on the merits. 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The plaintiff State of Utah filed a two-count Compla~nt 
in the lower court against the defendant Coram and the 
defendant Musselman. Count I alleges a claim against the 
defendant Coram under the Medical Benefits Recovery Act. 
Count I alleges a right to certain settlement proceeds 
received by the defendant Coram from a medical malpractice 
action prosecuted by the defendant Musselman as defendant 
Coram' s attorney. Count II alleges an alternative claim 
against the defendant Musselman on the basis of an existing 
attorney-client relationship between the defendant Musselman 
and the State of Utah. 
The defendant Coram was never served with process and 
is not a party to these proceedings. Default judgment was 
entered against the defendant Musselman on Count I of the 
Complaint only. Count II of the Complaint was abandoned by 
the State of Utah and does not form a part of the Default 
Judgment. 
The defendant Musselman timely filed a Motion to Set 
Aside the Default and Default Judgment entered against him. 
This motion was denied by the lower court, the Honorable G. 
Hal Taylor presiding. 
There are two issues to resolve in determining whether 
or not the default judgment against Defendant Musselman 
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should be set aside. Those issues are: (1) was the conduct 
of the defendant Musselman in failing to timely answer 
excusable; and (2) did the defendant Musselman tender a 
meritorious defense to the Complaint? 
In the first paragraph of the opinion, this Honorable 
Court set forth the defendant Musselman's basic contention 
with respect to his right to have the default judgment set 
aside due to excusable neglect. Mr. Musselman, at the time 
of the entry of default, had only a few days before been 
released as an inpatient from the Utah Valley Hospital, and 
was at home convalescing pursuant to the direction of his 
treating physician. This Court implicitly held Mr. 
Musselman's conduct to be excusable. The lower court 
likewise implicitly held Mr. Musselman's conduct to be 
excusable. 
The only issue remaining before this Court for decision 
is whether or not Mr. Musselman in his tendered answer 
proffered a meritorious defense to Count I of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
This Honorable Court affirmed the lower court's denial 
of defendant Musselman's Motion to Set Aside on the basis of 
two controlling facts set forth in paragraph 2 of the 
Court's opinion. First, this Honorable Court assumed that 
the defendant Musselman admitted a right of subrogation to 
the settlement proceeds of the defendant Coram pursuant to 
-3-
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the Medical Benefits Recovery Act. Second, the Court 
assumed that an assignment and the ref ore righ.t of 
subrogation was admitted by the defendant Musselman. 
Neither of these two controlling facts are admitted or 
conceded by the defendant Musselman. 
Given that the two controlling facts assumed by this 
Honorable Court are disputed and at issue, it is clear that 
the tendered answer of the defendant Musselman sets forth 
several meritorious defenses to the plaintiff's Complaint. 
The defendant Musselman's Motion to Set Aside is well taken 
and he must be given his day in Court. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING CONTROLLING FACTS 
WHICH ARE NEITHER CONCEDED, ADMITTED NOR 
SUPPORTED BY THE PLEADINGS 
A. The Defendant Musselman Did Not Admit or Concede 
to a Right of Subrogation 
Paragraph 2 of the Court's opinion states that the 
defendant Musselman conceded a right of subrogation. The 
defendant Musselman in his tendered answer (R. 30) asserted 
that the plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory 
requirement set forth in the Medical Benefits Recovery Act. 
Those requirements include the filing of a verified lien 
statement. The Affidavit of Paul Badger, Clerk of the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
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appended to defendant Musselman's principal brief, 
established that no verified lien statement as requi~ed by 
the Medical Benefits Recovery Act was ever filed by 
State of Utah. 
the 
' 
The defendant Musselman in his tendered answer alleged 
that the defendant Coram had not been made whole in her 
medical malpractice claim. It is a well-established 
principle of law in the State of Utah that there is no right 
of subrogation until an injured party is first made whole. 
This is more fully discussed in Point V below. 
B. The Defendant Musselman has Never Conceded or Admitted 
an Assignment of Benefits to the State of Utah 
Paragraph 2 of the First Count of Plaintiff's Complaint 
alleges that the defendant Coram made a written assignment 
of benefits to the State of Utah. There is no allegation 
that the defendant Musselman made any such written 
assignment. 
In the answer tendered by Mr. Musselman, it was 
initially admitted that such an a_ssignment by Coram was 
made. However, such admission was made in reliance upon the 
assertion by counsel for the State that an assignment had 
been given by defendant Coram and would be provided to the 
defendant Musselman. No assignment has ever been provided 
to the defendant Musselman, the defendant Coram, or to 
counsel for defendant Musselman. A request has been made 
-5-
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upon the State on several occasions for a copy of such 
assignment. 
It is quite obvious that no judgment against Mr. 
Musselman can be supported by an assignment made by the 
defendant Coram. Moreover, the plaintiff did not plead any 
cause of action pursuant to the alleged written assignment 
even against the defendant Coram who was never served. 
Moreover, even assuming a cause of action could be made 
out against the defendant Coram on the basis of a written 
assignment, the Sixth Affirmative Defense in the tendered 
answer of the defendant Musselman states a meritorious 
defense to that claim. 
the defendant Coram 
The defendant Musselman alleged that 
had not been made whole by the 
settlement proceeds she received in her medical malpractice 
claim. Subrogation is a matter of equity, and no right of 
subrogation exists until an injured party is made whole. 
See Point V. 
The First Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint is 
completely and solely based upon t~e alleged right of the 
plaintiff to recover pursuant to the Medical Benefits 
Recovery Act. The allegation of the existence of a written 
assignment by the defendant Coram is superfluous to Count I 
of Plaintiff's Complaint, and forms no part of the default 
judgment taken by the plaintiff against the defendant 
Musselman. This Court cannot uphold the default judgment 
-6-
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against the defendant Musselman upon the basis of a 
potential claim against the defendant Coram that was never 
pled. 
POINT II 
COUNT ONE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT D. JOHN MUSSELMAN. 
A. Default Judgment was Based on Count I Only 
It is clear from the District Court record that the 
default judgment in favor of the plaintiff was taken only on 
the First Cause of Action and not upon the Second Cause of 
Action. The First Cause of Action alleges an obligation of 
$82,522.22 and contains a prayer for $82,522.22. The Second 
Cause of Action, on the other hand, contains a prayer for 
damages of $61,891.66 plus punitive damages in the amount of 
$25,000.00. The default judgment makes no reference to any 
of the specific sums prayed for in the Second Cause of 
Action. On its face, it is clear the default judgment was 
entered on the First Cause of Action for the exact amount 
prayed in the sum of $82, 522. 22. 
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B. Entry of Default on Count II Would Mandate 
Summary Reversal 
In the case of Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. 
West, 437 P.2d 214, 20 U.2d 292 (1968), this Court ruled and 
held that it was error for the District Court to award 
punitive damages without proof. This error in and of itself 
justified vacating Mr. West's default. In this case, the 
record reveals no evidentiary hearing or findings of fact. 
To find that the default judgment was entered on the Second 
Cause of Action would require the default to be set aside 
based upon Security Adjustment Bureau, supra. 
C. Count I Fails to State a Claim for Relief Against 
Defendant Musselman 
The essential factual allegations, paragraph by 
paragraph, in the plaintiff's First Cause are as follows: 
( 1) the defendant Coram received Medicaid assistance from 
the State; (2) the defendant Coram made a written assignment 
of benefits to the State; (3) subrogation rights are 
provided in the Medical Bene£ its _Recovery Act; ( 4) the 
defendant Musselman was retained by the defendant Coram as 
her attorney; (5) the defendants failed to comply with the 
notice provisions of the Medical Benefits Recovery Act; (6) 
the State gave written notice to the defendants of its 
alleged lien rights; ( 7) the defendant Coram settled her 
case in chief without the approval or consent of the State; 
(8) the defendant Musselman placed $60,000.00 of said 
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settlement into a separate account and disbursed the balance 
of the settlement; and (9) there exists no attorney-Glient 
contract between the State and the defendant Musselman. (R. 
2-5). 
A review of the factual assertions stated in the 
plaintiff's First Cause of Action may suggest a claim 
against the defendant Linda Ann Coram, but certainly do not 
allege a claim against the defendant Musselman. 
Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Plaintiff's First Claim 
allege that the defendant Coram, through her attorney, the 
defendant Musselman, failed to comply with the notice 
provisions set forth in the Medical Benefits Recovery Act. 
Mr. Musselman' s tendered Answer denies these allegations. 
However, even assuming that the State could establish such 
disputed facts, the allegations of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 do 
not state a claim against Mr. Musselman. 
Paragraph 9 alleges that no contract of representation 
existed between the State of Utah and the defendant D. John 
Musselman. Such an allegation cert~inly does not form the 
basis of any claim for relief that could be granted by the 
Court against Mr. Musselman. 
The only other paragraph that makes any reference to 
the defendant D. John Musselman is paragraph 8. Paragraph 8 
alleges that Mr. Musselman gave "notice by telephone to the 
department that he had placed Sixty Thousand Dollars 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
($60,000.00) of said settlement funds in his trust account". 
The defendant Musselman admits giving such notice. The 
defendant Musselman, indeed, did place such funds in trQst 
for his client, the defendant Coram. 
The tendered Answer denies the existence of any valid 
lien of the plaintiff. The fact that Mr. Musselman placed 
funds in trust for his client does not form the basis of any 
claim for relief against the defendant Musselman. 
D. The Defendant Musselman was an Attorney - Trustee 
Only for Defendant Coram, and No Judgment can be 
had Against Mr. Musselman Personally 
The First Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint 
pleads essentially that the defendant Musselman was counsel 
for the defendant Coram in a medical malpractice suit. The 
defendant Musselman for and on behalf of his client effected 
and obtained a $150,000.00 settlement for the injuries the 
defendant Coram sustained. The Complaint further alleges 
that Mr. Musselman held $60,000.00 of the defendant Coram's 
settlement funds in trust. The State finally alleges a lien 
on the defendant Coram' s settlement funds. 
From the Complaint, it is clear that the relationship 
of the defendant Musselman to the defendant Coram was one of 
attorney-client and trustee-beneficiary. It is el~mentary 
law requiring no citation that an attorney or tru$tee has no 
primary obligation for the debts of the client or 
beneficiary. 
-10-
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With respect to any debts of the defendant Coram, 
the liability of the defendant Musselman is limited to _those 
assets held by him in trust for the defendant Cor~m. 
Moreover, his liability is not primary and a judgment cannot 
be had against him personally. In the event of a judgment 
against the defendant Coram, the assets of Coram held by 
Musselman could be garnished or attached under proper 
procedure. 
The plaintiff's First Cause of Action, upon which the 
State's default is predicated, states no claim against 
Mr. Musselman and the default against Mr. Musselman must be 
set aside. 
POINT III 
A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE WAS TENDERED TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The First Cause of Action is clearly based solely on 
the provisions of the Medical Benefits Recovery Act which 
was codified at §55-15(d)-l through 55-lS(d)-17, inclusive, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). The defendant Musselman 
tendered an answer which alleged the failure by the plain-
tiff to comply with the statute. The tendered answer 
affirmatively alleged in the Third Defense that the statute 
sued upon by the State required a 25% reduction. The Fourth 
-11-
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Defense affirmatively alleges that the plaintiff had failed 
to comply with the statute and was entitled to no re~overy 
whatsoever. The answer further alleged in the Fifth Defe~se 
that the plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory 
notice and filing requirements. The Sixth Defense alleged 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the amount 
prayed for, for equitable reasons, in that the defendant 
Coram was not made whole in the settlement of her medical 
malpractice claim. These issues as to whether the plaintiff 
complied with the statutory requirements of the Medical 
Benefits Recovery Act are issues of fact properly raised in 
the defendant Musselman's tendered Answer and raise a 
meritorious defense. 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF MADE NO CLAIM IN ITS 
COMPLAINT BASED UPON ANY WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT 
The Plaintiff's Complaint states no claim whatsoever 
based upon any assignment of benefits by the defendant 
Coram. The only mention of any assignment is in paragraph 2 
of the Plaintiff's Complaint. The defendant Musselman in 
his tendered Answer initially admitted paragraph 2 of the 
Plaintiff's Complaint only because of the positive assurance 
by plaintiff's counsel that such an assignment existed and 
-12-
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the promise by counsel to provide a copy thereof to the 
defendant Musselman. No such assignment was ever prqvided 
to defendant Musselman, and no such assignment has ever been 
provided to counsel for Mr. Musselman, although a copy has 
been requested on several occasions by counsel. It is now 
believed on information that such a written assignment does 
not exist and never has existed. 
The Complaint does not state any claim based upon an 
assignment by defendant Coram of benefits. The First Cause 
of Action is completely and solely based upon the alleged 
right of the plaintiff to recover pursuant to the Medical 
Benefits Recovery Act. 
The allegation of the existence of an assignment by 
defendant Coram is superfluous to Count I of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. This Court cannot uphold the default judgment 
upon the basis of a potential claim that was never pled. 
POINT V 
NO CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON AN ALLEGED WRITTEN 
ASSIGNMENT EXECUTED BY DEFENDANT CORAM CAN 
BE MADE AGAINST DEFENDANT MUSSELMAN AND 
A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO A CLAIM BASED 
UPON AN ALLEGED WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT WAS 
SET FORTH IN MR. MUSSELMAN'S TENDERED ANSWER 
Even if the Plaintiff's Complaint were construed to 
contain a cause of action based upon a written assignment by 
-13-
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defendant Coram, that cause is obviously not against the 
defendant Musselman but could only be asserted again~t the 
defendant Coram. No claim for relief is stated or can be 
stated against the defendant Musselman by virtue of an 
alleged assignment of benefits executed by the defendant 
Coram. 
Furthermore, an affirmative defense to any possible 
claim against defendant Coram based upon a written 
assignment of benefits is contained in the defendant 
Musselman's Sixth Affirmative Defense in his tendered 
Answer. The Sixth Defense provides that the plaintiff is 
not entitled to a recovery as prayed for by reason that the 
defendant Coram was not made whole or fully compensated for 
her personal injuries. 
It is a well-established principle of law recognized by 
the State of Utah that an injured party is entitled to be 
made whole before any benefits received by the injured party 
are subject to subrogation. This principle of law was 
succinctly stated by this Honorable_ Court in Transamerica 
Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 29 U.2d 101, 505 P.2d 783, (1972): 
Equitable principles apply to subrogation, 
and the insured is entitled to be made whole 
before the insurer may recover any portion of 
the recovery from the tortfeasor. If the one 
responsible has paid the full extent of the 
loss, the insured should not claim both sums, 
and the insurer may then assert its claim to 
subrogation. Subrogation is not a matter of 
right but may be invoked only in those 
circumstances where justice demands its 
-14-
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application, and the rights of the one 
seeking subrogation have a greater equity 
than the one who opposes him. Subrogation is 
not permitted where it will work any 
injustice to others. To entitle one to 
subrogation, the equities of one's case must 
be strong, as equity will, in general, 
relieve only those who could not have 
relieved themselves. The purpose of 
subrogation, as a creation of equity, is to 
effect an adjustment between parties so as to 
secure ultimately the payment or discharge of 
a debt by a person who in good conscience 
ought to pay for it. 505 P.2d at 786 
(emphasis added) 
The Court is referred to two other key cases setting 
forth the equitable principle of subrogation and the right 
of the injured party to first be made whole. Lyon v. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. , 25 u .2d 311, 480 P.2d 
739 (1971); Allstate Insurance Company v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 
119 7 (Utah , 19 8 0 ) . 
The defendant Coram was not made whole in the 
settlement of her medical malpractice claim. A determination 
by a competent court is necessary to fix the proper amount, 
if any, to which the State may be entitled to recover 
pursuant to Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted and reiterated that there exists only 
two issues that are properly and appropriately before this 
Court. First, was the defendant Musselman' s conduct and 
failure to answer excusable? The defendant Musselman at the 
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time of the entry of default had, only a few days before, 
been released as an inpatient from the Utah Valley Hospital, 
and was at home convalescing pursuant to the directives .of 
his treating physician. Mr. Musselman's hospitalization and 
serious illness clearly constitutes excusable neglect. This 
Court and the lower court implicitly found the existence of 
excusable neglect. 
There remains, the ref ore, only the second and final 
issue: did the defendant Musselman tender a meritorious 
defense? The defendant Musselman need not prove his 
tendered defense, rather the law of this State, as 
explicitly enunciated by this Honorable Court, provides that 
Mr. Musselman need only proffer facts which, if established, 
would be a meritorious defense. 
This Court, in its earlier decision under date of 
July 26, 1982, based its affirmation of the Lower Court on 
certain admissions allegedly made by the defendant 
Musselman. Such admissions were not made by the defendant 
Musselman as explained in this brief. Mr. Musselman has 
clearly set forth facts which, if established, would be a 
meritorious defense to the plaintiff's claim. Indeed, as 
set forth herein, the defendant Musselman has proffered 
facts, which, if proven, would establish that the Complaint 
fails even to state a claim against him. 
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The mdst fundamental and basic premise of our judiciil 
system is that every man is entitled to his day in _court 
where he can present his case to an impartial tribun~l. 
Mr. Musselman has been denied that fundamental 
constitutional right. This Court must right that wrong and 
set aside the default judgment against" Mr. Musselman. 
DATED this~ day of September, 1982. 
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